DARPA FACT FILE



A Compendium of DARPA Programs

April 2002

FORWARD

Purpose: DARPA’s charter is to prevent technological surprise from harming U.S. national security by sponsoring revolutionary and innovative high-payoff research. This document provides short summaries of selected DARPA programs in FY 2002 and FY 2003, and it is intended as a ready reference for those interested in DARPA’s research portfolio. To better illustrate the goals of the programs, the programs have been grouped into three broad areas, each with various sub-areas:

• National Level Problems – Find solutions to urgent, difficult and dangerous threats to U.S. national security, which require an in-depth response beyond that of the Military Services;
  

• Operational Dominance – Develop advanced systems and technologies that leapfrog current capabilities and threats to give U.S. Forces a decisive edge; and
  

• High-Risk, High-Payoff Technologies – Create technological advances that will enable quantum leaps in military capabilities.

There are indexes in the back of the document for finding individual programs and cross-referencing them to Program Elements in the President’s FY 2003 budget.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

National-Level Problems

    Programs in this area are aimed at finding solutions to urgent, difficult, and dangerous threats to U.S. national security, which require an in-depth response beyond that of the Military Services. In particular, these programs are meant to counter asymmetric and transnational threats, such as terrorist, biological warfare, or information attacks, and maintain unhindered U.S. access to space.

DARPA SUPPORT FOR THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM

Operation Enduring Freedom

    Since September 11, the war on terrorism has been foremost in everyone’s minds. Several DARPA technologies are being used to support Operation Enduring Freedom.

    Water Purification: Warfighters are testing 6-inch-long pen-sized water purification kits developed by DARPA that consume plain salt tablets and purify up to 300 liters of water on a single camera battery.

    Automatic Phrase Translators: In Afghanistan today, warfighters are using hand-held machine phrase translation devices that support direct operations, such as force protection, medical triage, and refugee re-unification; the devices are deployed at our embassy and with forces in the field. These systems support such local native languages as Pashto, Urdu, and Dari. While this one-way technology was militarily hardened and delivered in just 90 days, the follow-on effort, producing a task-constrained two-way speech translation capability, will have its first prototype in the hands of warfighters and embassy staff before the end of this fiscal year, a functional capability that simply does not exist anywhere today.

    Rapid Network Tool: In early 2000, DARPA and the Air Force launched a joint experiment to address critical Link 16 network shortfalls demonstrated in Kosovo. This experiment had very rapid payoff with DARPA-developed software tools now being used in Operation Enduring Freedom to reconfigure a theater-wide Link 16 network for military aircraft in a few hours – a task that previously took many weeks.

    Rapid Planning: The Active Templates program, working in close collaboration with the Joint Special Operations Command, has developed the software tools-of-choice for special operations command and control. These tools allow military planners to sketch out plans against a time-line or with a map or image in the background, merge plans from other teams that are connected to the network, de-conflict and coordinate changes as plans solidify, and then use these same tools to track the progress of the battle during mission execution. Time-and-motion studies show that these tools speed planning by a factor of four, buying time for rehearsal and critical decision-making. These prototype tools were advocated for use following several successful special operations exercises in FY 2001. In October, they were deployed and have been used continually to support combat operations in Operation Enduring Freedom.

    Operation Noble Eagle 
    On the American homefront, DARPA technology has been used in homeland defense, Operation Noble Eagle.

    Medical Surveillance: The Air Force’s Lightweight Epidemiology Advanced Detection and Emergency Response System (LEADERS) uses key components of DARPA’s Enhanced Consequence Management Planning and Support System. A commercialized version of the DARPA bio-surveillance program, LEADERS, provided medical surveillance for signs and symptoms of a biological attack for the state of New York within 24 hours of the attack on the World Trade Center. The Centers for Disease Control also used LEADERS to monitor for specified syndromes from hospitals within in the New York City area and report them back in real-time to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta via the Internet.

    Capitol Hill Remediation: As a result of DARPA’s investments in the Immune Building program, DARPA was asked to serve as science advisors to the team responsible for the anthrax decontamination on Capitol Hill. DARPA was asked to review decontamination technologies and, in support of this request, we also conducted quick-turnaround testing on three separate candidates to determine efficacy. The chlorine dioxide approach developed under Immune Buildings was selected for the challenging job of remediating the Hart Senate Office Building. In addition, DARPA helped identify and obtain air sampling equipment to support the Environmental Protection Agency and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention efforts to verify that the buildings were safe for reoccupation. DARPA has also supported Congress by developing, installing, and testing mail-screening equipment to prevent additional contamination from entering the buildings through the mail system.

    Advanced Airport Security: Following the September 11 aircraft hijackings, the Secretary of Defense directed DARPA to conduct a study of aviation security aimed at the future needs of our country. DARPA sought information from a wide variety of Government agencies, Defense contractors, commercial vendors, and Federal laboratories, as well as from individuals with no previous aviation security experience. The outcome of the study recognizes that substantial organizational, procedural and technical challenges exist. Proposed solutions range from straightforward engineering tasks that may satisfy near-term security needs, all the way to those that may require scientific breakthroughs in order to assure protection against an evolving threat. DARPA is now working closely with agencies, such as Transportation Security Agency, Federal Aviation Agency, Department of Transportation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Office of Homeland Security as they work to develop and implement more capable security operations.

    Information Awareness
    The DARPA Information Awareness Office (IAO) is the focal point for DARPA’s effort to develop and demonstrate information technologies and components, and prototype closed-loop information systems. These information systems will counter asymmetric threats by achieving total information awareness useful for preemption, national-security warning, and national-security decision-making.

    The most serious asymmetric threat facing the U.S. is terrorism. This threat is characterized by collections of people loosely organized in shadowy networks that are difficult to identify and define. These networks must be detected, identified, and tracked. IAO plans to develop technology that will allow understanding of the intent of terrorist networks, their plans, and potentially define opportunities for disrupting or eliminating the threats.

    To effectively and efficiently carry this out, technology must be developed that will promote sharing, collaborating, and reasoning to convert nebulous data to knowledge and actionable options. IAO will accomplish this by pursuing the development of technologies, components, and applications to produce a prototype system.

    Today’s intelligence infrastructure was designed for the Cold War and is well-suited to major military conflicts and strategic threats. However, our information about foreign terrorists is spotty at best – and our efforts to integrate and extend current intelligence systems is unlikely to provide sufficient coverage. Foreign terrorists do not require large numbers to cause great damage, nor must they attack us frequently to influence us: they are low-density, low-intensity combatants. Commercial information technology provides foreign terrorists with cheap, effective communications, planning data, and command and control capabilities – as good as most governments. The availability of biological and chemical weapons, in addition to novel methods of attack, pose a broad and continuing threat to the U.S.

    To address today’s threat, we need to turn information technology around and use it against foreign terrorists, gathering so much information on them that we can predict and preempt attacks – or, at the very least, strike back with speed, certainty, and finality. The kind of information we need today differs significantly from what we needed during the Cold War. We will need much more information, from both “traditional” intelligence sources and many more sources in addition, and we will need to filter this information to protect the privacy of U.S. citizens and innocents world-wide. We will also need new technology for effectively managing all this information and for reducing the cost of building the many new specific systems required to capture information. Because raw data must be interpreted, we need a collection of automated and semi-automated technologies that amplify the efforts of human analysts to provide greatly improved attack prediction and preemption capabilities. Finally, we need more effective methods for sharing information between Government agencies – capabilities for rapidly assembling teams of people with the right experience and relationships by means of effective tools that support collaboration across organizational boundaries. DARPA’s Information Awareness Office was established to create component technologies to address these needs. 

Example technologies of interest to IAO are:

• Collaboration and sharing over TCP/IP networks across agency boundaries;

• Large, distributed repositories with dynamic schemas that may be changed interactively by users;

• Foreign language machine translation and speech recognition;

• Biometric signatures of humans;

• Real-time learning, pattern-matching, and anomalous pattern detection;

• Human network analysis and behavior model building engines;

• Event prediction and capability development model building engines;

• Change detection; and

• Biologically inspired algorithms for agent control.

    DARPA’s information awareness programs will leverage other DARPA investments in information and other relevant technologies. DARPA plans to work closely with the Intelligence Community, other agencies of the national security community, and other relevant agencies of the U.S. Government.

    The Total Information Awareness (TIA) program will develop and integrate information technologies into a prototype system to detect, classify, and identify potential foreign terrorists so that we may have a better understanding of their plans, thereby increasing the probability that the U.S. can preempt adverse actions.

    The TIA program will integrate technologies developed by DARPA (and elsewhere, as appropriate) into a series of increasingly powerful prototype systems that can be stress-tested in operationally relevant environments using real-time feedback to refine concepts of operation and performance requirements down to the component level. The ultimate goal is to create a counter-terrorism information system that: (i) increases the information coverage by an order-of-magnitude and can be easily scaled; (ii) provides focused warnings within an hour after a triggering event occurs or an evidence threshold is passed; (iii) can automatically cue analysts based on partial pattern matches and has patterns that cover 90 percent of all known previous foreign terrorist attacks; and (iv) supports collaboration, analytical reasoning, and information sharing so that analysts can hypothesize, test, and propose theories and mitigating strategies about possible futures so that decision-makers can effectively evaluate the impact of current or future policies.

    DARPA will work in close collaboration with one or more U.S. intelligence agencies that will provide operational guidance and evaluation and will act as a technology maturation and transition partner. In the near-term, this collaboration will take place within the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. TIA’s focus is on developing usable tools, rather than conducting demonstrations. The program intends to create fully functional, leave-behind prototypes that are reliable, easy to install, and packaged with documentation and source code (though not necessarily complete in terms of desired features) that will enable the Intelligence Community to evaluate new TIA technology through experimentation and rapidly transition it to operational use, as appropriate. 

    Below, we describe the component programs that contribute to TIA:

    Project Genoa, which is concluding, provides the structured argumentation, decision-making, and corporate memory to rapidly deal with, and adjust to, dynamic crisis management. Project Genoa is developing information technology for the Intelligence Community to rapidly and systematically accumulate evidence, facilitate collaboration while protecting critical information, and test hypotheses that support decision-making at the national level. In FY 2000, Project Genoa matured and transitioned a new “thematic” search engine tool to users on Intelink. The tool, “Athens,” complements traditional search engines by allowing users to find nuggets of information in large collections of documents without having to construct a complicated query. A thematic search engine is more efficient for two reasons. First, it allows the user to specify keywords one at a time and exposes the search index by providing all related keywords and the amount of information that would be returned at each step. Users can build search queries incrementally, selecting additional search terms from a list – there is less information to sift through to find the information one needs, and one never gets 10,000 hits on a query, which is the frequent result of using ordinary search engines. Second, a thematic search engine also reduces the information returned by breaking up HTML pages into smaller units, e.g., paragraphs or a few sentences. With a standard search engine, the smallest unit of information is a complete page, even though, most of the time, an analyst’s question is very specific. With the standard engine, the analyst has to scan a lot of irrelevant information to find the desired bit. 

    Based on successful technology demonstrations, the Defense Intelligence Agency has agreed to be a transition partner for Project Genoa technology. In FY 2001, Genoa evidence-accumulation components were delivered to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, the Joint Information Operations Center, the Joint Forces Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the Joint Counter-intelligence Assessment Group (JCAG). JCAG is now actively using Genoa capabilities to support and enhance its own critical mission. Furthermore, JCAG is using these same capabilities to support other Federal agencies involved in the war on terrorism, most notably the Department of Justice’s Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force. The use of DARPA-developed capabilities to counter and preempt foreign and domestic terrorist threats is an excellent example of how sustained investment in science and technology provides support to the warfighter. In FY 2002, these transition activities will be completed. 

    Project Genoa II, part of DARPA’s Total Information Awareness program, will focus on the information technology support needed by teams of intelligence analysts and operations and policy personnel as they attempt to anticipate and preempt asymmetric threats to U.S. interests. The U.S. Government has been slow to change concept of operations and to assimilate new information technologies for this purpose. Needed are faster systems of humans and machines, ways to overcome the biases and limitations of the human cognitive system, “cognitive amplifiers” that help teams of people rapidly and deeply understand complicated and uncertain situations, and a breaking-down of existing stovepiped information repositories. Genoa II will respond with elements aimed at making the teams faster, smarter, and “more joint.” The project will apply automation to team processes so that more can be accomplished sooner – more information will be exploited, more hypotheses created and examined, more models built and populated with evidence, and, in the larger sense, more crises situations dealt with simultaneously. It will develop and deploy cognitive aids that allow humans and machines to think together about complicated problems, especially new and deadly asymmetric challenges intended to bypass our existing national security apparatus. Genoa II’s products will be deployed to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.

    The Genisys program will produce technology for an ultra-large, all-source information repository to help prevent foreign terrorist attacks on the citizens, institutions, and property of the U.S. and its allies. To predict, track, and thwart (or, at least, mitigate) attacks, the U.S. needs a full-coverage database that includes information about all potential foreign terrorists and possible supporters, terrorist material, training/preparation/rehearsal activities, potential targets, specific plans, and the status of our defenses. Current database technology is clearly insufficient to address the need to integrate all relevant existing databases and semi-structured information sources, to automatically populate the new repository with many different and non-traditional data-feeds, and to enable the easy creation of new information systems, which today exist only in manual form. Today’s database technology was defined in the 1980s, but current processors, disks, and networks are a thousand times more capable. Genisys will reinvent this technology to meet today’s needs and capabilities.

    In contrast to today’s relational databases, Genisys will: (i) require no a priori data modeling and use a simpler query language, making it easier to dramatically increase the information coverage we now know we need to stop foreign terrorists; (ii) support automated restructuring and projection of data, making it easier to declassify and share data between Government organizations and with coalition partners; (iii) store data in context of time and space to help resolve uncertainty that always exists in data, but is not modeled today; (iv) create privacy filters, aliasing methods, and automated data expunging agents to protect the privacy of U.S. citizens and those who have nothing to do with foreign terrorists; and (v) develop a large, distributed system architecture for managing the huge volume of raw data input, analysis results, and feedback – the goal being a simpler, more flexible data store that still performs well and allows us to retain important data forever. The goal of the program is not only to demonstrate technologies, but also to develop a series of increasingly powerful leave-behind prototypes so that the Intelligence Community can get value immediately and provide feedback to focus research. These technologies and components will feed into the Total Information Awareness program.

    The Evidence Extraction and Link Discovery (EELD) program is developing technologies and tools for automated discovery, extraction, and linking of sparse evidence contained in large amounts of classified and unclassified data sources. EELD is developing detection capabilities to extract relevant data and relationships about people, organizations, locations, and activities from message traffic and open source data. It will then link together related items that comprise potential terrorist groups or scenarios and learn patterns of different groups or scenarios to identify new organizations or emerging threats. EELD has demonstrated the feasibility of extracting organizational relationships in the context of a business domain, and it has validated the existence of detectable patterns representing potential terrorist threat scenarios. EELD also developed two promising techniques for learning patterns of activity that allow for recognition and visualization of relationships as they change over time. In FY 2001, EELD selected techniques the program will develop for evidence extraction, link discovery, pattern learning, and scenarios, and the program initiated the collection and characterization of documents for technology evaluations. In FY 2002, EELD is developing and demonstrating technology to extract relationships, and detect and learn single-link (e.g., financial transactions or communications events between individuals) type patterns. In FY 2003, EELD will extend its capabilities to the extraction of data from multiple sources (e.g., text messages and web pages), with an ability to adapt rapidly to new threat domains. The EELD program will also develop the ability to detect instances of patterns comprising multiple link types (e.g., financial transactions, communications, and travel), and it will develop the ability to learn patterns comprised of multiple types of entities (e.g., persons and organizations) and multiple link types.

    The Wargaming the Asymmetric Environment (WAE) program will develop and demonstrate specific, predictive technology to better anticipate and act against terrorists. WAE is a revolutionary approach to identifying predictive indicators of terrorist-specific attacks and behaviors by examining their behavior in the broader context of their political, cultural, and ideological environment. Initial test results demonstrate the feasibility of developing automated and adaptive behavior prediction models tuned to specific terrorist groups and individuals. Specifically, WAE has developed, in conjunction with DoD and the Intelligence Community, indication and warning models for select terrorist individuals and organizations. These indication and warning models have been tested historically and, in some cases, operationally, to predict an active terrorist group’s next action (attack/no attack, target characteristics, location characteristics, tactical characteristics, timeframes, and motivating factors). The results of these tests are statistically significant, and several models have been transitioned to our DoD and Intelligence Community partners. In FY 2002, WAE is extending its predictive technology research to model a larger set of terrorist groups and individuals, and it will further exploit predictive technologies to increase the level of detail for each predictive model. In FY 2003, WAE will develop terrorist-specific intervention models based upon their respective motivational factors.

    The Translingual Information Detection, Extraction and Summarization (TIDES) program is creating technology to enable English speakers to locate and interpret critical information in multiple languages without requiring knowledge of those languages. The source data could be unformatted raw audio or text, stationary or streaming; critical information could span one or more sources in one or more languages. TIDES technology includes synergistic components for: (i) finding or discovering needed information; (ii) extracting key information about entities, relations, and events; (iii) substantially reducing the amount that a person must read; and (iv) converting foreign language material to English. TIDES has created two text and audio processing systems (known as OnTAP and MiTAP) and is using them in Integrated Feasibility Experiments involving bio-security and terrorism. The experiments, being conducted at contractor facilities with the assistance of military and intelligence personnel, are designed to assess the utility of the evolving technology, to learn where improvements are needed, to develop effective concepts of operation, and to jump-start the transfer of the most effective technology into operational use. Work on Arabic was substantially accelerated in response to the events of September 11. In FY 2003, TIDES will demonstrate initial machine translation capabilities from Chinese and Arabic to English. These demonstrations will be done for Navy and Intelligence Community partners at various U.S. locations. The goal of TIDES is not simply to increase productivity: it provides commanders and other decision-makers with a great deal of timely, vital information that is currently out of reach.

    The Human Identification at a Distance (HumanID) program is developing automated biometric identification technologies to detect, recognize, and identify humans at great distances. A biometric technology is a method for identifying an individual from his face, fingerprints, or the way he walks. These technologies will provide critical early warning support for force protection and homeland defense against terrorist, criminal, and other human-based threats. It will prevent or decrease the success rate of such attacks against DoD operational facilities and installations. The program will develop methods for fusing these biometric technologies into advanced human identification systems to enable faster, more accurate, and unconstrained identification at great distances. In FY 2001, HumanID developed a pilot force protection system to identify humans at a distance in outdoor operational DoD settings. It used specific Military Service sites as prototype models for designing demonstrations and experiments. The program also performed preliminary assessments of current and future technologies. In FY 2002, HumanID plans to develop a prototype advanced human identification system and develop methods and algorithms for fusing biometric technologies and deriving biometric signatures. The system will be evaluated and demonstrated at a variety of force protection and homeland defense sites. HumanID will determine the critical factors that affect performance of biometric components and identify the limits of range, accuracy, and reliability. Only the most promising technologies will continue development based upon evaluation of their performance. In FY 2003, HumanID plans to extend the prototype identification system and further develop biometric fusion algorithms for up to five biometric components. The program will also conduct multi-modal fusion experiments and performance evaluations. Advanced human recognition capabilities will be demonstrated in multiple force protection and/or homeland defense environments.

    The objective of the Bio-Surveillance program is to develop the necessary information technologies and resulting prototype system capable of detecting a large-scale, covert release of a biological pathogen automatically and significantly earlier than with traditional approaches. The key to mitigating a biological attack is early detection. Given the availability of appropriate medications, as many as half the expected casualties could be prevented if an attack were detected only a few days earlier than if detection were delayed until after a significant number of infected individuals entered the health-care system. We are seeking to achieve this increase by monitoring non-traditional data sources, such as animal health, behavioral indicators, and pre-diagnostic medical data. Technical challenges include correlating/integrating information derived from heterogeneous data sources, development of autonomous signal detection algorithms, refinement of disease models for autonomous detection, and ensuring privacy protection. The program will leverage existing disease models and “mine” existing databases to determine the most valuable early indicators for abnormal health conditions. The program will also develop techniques to determine the best way to differentiate “normal” outbreaks of disease from deliberate bio-terrorist releases. The program will develop enhanced automated privacy protection methods to assure the anonymity of records accessed by the data monitoring software. End-to-end prototypes in two cities of military interest will be constructed for evaluation of the data sources and detection techniques. The Bio-Surveillance program will dramatically increase DoD’s ability to detect a clandestine biological warfare attack in time to respond effectively and, therefore, avoid potentially thousands of casualties. During FY 2002, the program will identify, characterize, and evaluate non-traditional data sources and detection algorithms. During FY 2003, the program will incorporate disease progression simulations and privacy protection algorithms. Technology developed under this program will be available for transition to military and civilian bio-surveillance systems.

    The specific goal of the DARPA Communicator program is to develop and demonstrate “dialogue interaction” technology that enables warriors to talk with computers. Information will be accessible on the battlefield or in command centers without the warfighter ever having to touch a keyboard. The Communicator Platform will be wireless and mobile, and will function in a networked environment. Software-enabling dialogue interaction will automatically focus on the context of a dialogue to improve performance. Moreover, the system will adapt to new topics automatically, so that the conversation seems natural and efficient. The technology emphasizes computer-human arbitrated dialogue that uses task knowledge to compensate for natural language effects (e.g., dialects, disfluences, and noisy environments). The majority of the research effort has been on English/computer dialogues in support of command and control operations. Recently, research has begun on foreign language computer interaction in support of coalition operations. Unlike automated translation of news for unlimited vocabulary (speech-to-text, text-to-text) tasks, the effort here is directed toward human-to-machine interactions with task-specific issues that constrain vocabularies. In FY 1999, the program created an open-source architecture for a spoken language dialog system, which is being used by researchers and engineers to experiment with dialogue interaction techniques. In FY 2000, Communicator technology was used for logistic, command and control, and on-the-move information access experiments. DARPA and the sponsoring testers (U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps, through the Small Unit Logistics Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration) evaluated the system and architecture as being highly effective and having potential impact for use in future systems. In FY 2001, hands-on exercises were conducted for small unit logistics operations with the U.S. Marine Corps at Millennium Dragon (using a SINCGARS radio for a field interface) in order to stress-test the technology in extremely noisy and variable environments. In FY 2002, the Communicator system is being stressed in experiments with the Navy on the Sea Shadow and the F/A-18 maintenance mentor at Naval Air Station Patuxent River to support monitoring and alerting of systems, while concurrently improving both information access and distribution. The final Communicator experiment will demonstrate dialogue interaction with a wide array of distributed sensors, heterogeneous databases, and new noisy environments as the U.S. Army evaluates Communicator’s ability to automate the combat casualty reporting system. The measure of success will be performance gains for operators using natural dialogue interaction for high-stress and time-critical tasks. Success will validate a new approach for the way 21st century warriors interact with computers, and dialogue interaction will provide for new and effective concepts of operation. A FY 2003 follow-on project focusing Communicator on a command and control problem (e.g., a ship-wide, agent-based dialog network supporting system-wide monitoring and diagnosis aboard the Sea Shadow), as well as a tactical operations task (e.g., fielding the U.S. Army combat casualty system on the Land Warrior platform), may be used to ensure an effective transition mechanism for this revolutionary new interaction technology. 

    The goal of the Babylon program is to develop rapid, two-way, natural language speech translation interfaces and platforms for users in combat and other field environments with constrained military task domains of force protection, refugee processing, and medical triage. The seedling of Babylon, Rapid Multilingual Support, is being deployed to Afghanistan in the spring of 2002. Also under consideration is the appropriateness of developing a Babylon module for use at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to support prisoner interrogation. Babylon will focus on overcoming the many technical and engineering challenges limiting current multilingual translation technology. Babylon will provide an enabling technology to give language support to the warfighter in deciphering possibly critical language communications during operations in foreign territories. The first year (FY 2002) goal of the Babylon program is to build and rapidly deploy one-way speech translation systems in four target languages – Pashto, Dari, Arabic, and Mandarin – for direct support of overseas field operatives. The systems are delivered in the form of militarized palm-sized PDA devices with 12 hour battery endurance. In FY 2003, each of four Babylon two-way translation teams will develop 10 working-domain-constrained natural language translation prototypes on multiple platforms. Each system will undergo an evaluation process, and the successful teams will advance and continue to refine their systems through technology patches and insertions. In future years, we will expand domains (tasks) supported by our prototypes, and we will improve robustness and enhance the ability of the prototype to meet practical field requirements. This technology is immature and unstable due to the vast complexities of human-to-human communications. Open-domain (multitask), unconstrained dialog translation in multiple environments is still five to 10 years away. DARPA’s research is the stimulus to make sure that that capability becomes a reality. Babylon is focusing on low-population, high-terrorist-risk languages that will not be supported by any commercial enterprise.

    PROTECTION FROM BIOLOGICAL WARFARE ATTACK

    A clear and growing national security need is homeland defense and protection of our military forces from biological warfare attack by both military and terrorist organizations. The goal of DARPA’s Biological Warfare Defense thrust is to deter or thwart such attacks by developing the needed the sensors, medical diagnostics and countermeasures, building protection systems, and air and water purification devices.

Sensors

    To detect the presence of a threat agent, DARPA is investing in the development of advanced Biosensor Defense Systems that are robust, autonomous, fast, and sensitive to any known bacterial or viral organism, as well as to novel natural or engineered biowarfare agents. Two example systems are the TIGER and BioTOF sensor systems.

    TIGER, or Triangulation for Genetic Evaluation of Risks, is a novel and potentially universal approach to bio-detection. The TIGER sensor system combines a new triangulation approach for universal genome evaluation with advanced mass spectrometry and rigorous bio-informatic analysis. Triangulation involves integrating data from multiple regions along an organism’s genome to derive a unique identifier for that organism. This enables high performance (95 percent probability of detection), detection and classification of known, unknown, and bioengineered threats in complex mixtures. In FY 2001, we developed an end-to-end model that was used to make quantitative performance predictions based on existing sequence databases. During FY 2002, we are developing a “laboratory quality” TIGER system to gather data in real environments. We will use the model and data to design a prototype system in FY 2003.

    DARPA’s Biological Time-of-Flight Sensor (BioTOF) is a Matrix Assisted Laser Desorption Ionization time-of-flight mass spectrometer that will provide fast and accurate identification of biological warfare pathogens. In FY 2002, we will complete a rigorous evaluation of BioTOF brass-boards with completely automated sample collection and processing. Characterization of instrument performance will guide the design of the follow-on prototypes.

    DARPA is also developing a nucleic-acid-based microarray sensor to integrate and automate DNA/RNA isolation, labeling, and hybridization procedures into a single platform. The program has developed a first-generation biochip sensor designed to determine whether anthrax is present and to enable fast discrimination of hoaxes from real threats using universal ribosomal sequences. In FY 2002, we are developing a pox biochip for the detection of the family of pox virus related to smallpox. This pox biochip has been sent to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for testing. In FY 2003, we plan to develop a plague and toxin biochip.

    We are rigorously characterizing these systems for their detection performance against live agent challenges and realistic clutter, including a detailed evaluation of the detection and false alarm probabilities.

    Traditional sensors and detection technologies require previous knowledge about the structure or identity of the threat and only report on whether that known threat is present or not. The goal of the Tissue Based Biosensors and Activity Detection Technologies programs is to build sensor systems that detect a wide range of threats, including unknown, genetically engineered, or emerging threat agents. The programs are investigating whether it is possible to build sensors around cells or pieces of tissue to alert us to the presence of a toxic environment. These systems use the physiological response of biological cells and tissues to detect biological or chemical threats. We constructed a variety of laboratory prototypes in FY 2001, including an integrated chip microarray that incorporates liver tissue and measures liver response following exposure to biological agents and chemical toxins. We are also building and evaluating systems using lung tissue, neuronal cells, cardiac cells, fish chromatophores, and engineered B-cells. We demonstrated that we could build a shipping module that would allow the neurons to be stored or shipped and still remain stable and viable for up to a couple of months. In FY 2002, we are continuing the development of these systems to screen them against a wider list of chemical and biological threats and to determine the limits of sensitivity and false alarm rates. In FY 2003, we will begin to adapt the systems for testing and evaluation in a number of operational scenarios, including water-quality monitoring and air-quality monitoring.

    Medical Diagnostics and Countermeasures

    In the event of a biological attack, the U.S. will need to identify those who have been exposed to a biological warfare agent and to distinguish them from the “worried well,” as well as from those with natural diseases that might require different treatment. Therefore, identifying disease markers that can serve as rapid indicators of exposure is one of the focus areas of the Advanced Medical Diagnostics program. Efforts continue to define gene expression profiles following exposure to biological threat agents. In FY 2001, researchers identified unique genes that are only turned on following exposure. These genes can now be used to identify chip-based diagnostic systems, as well as therapeutic targets of action. Another activity in this program is identifying markers in exhaled breath that may be used to determine who has been exposed to a potential pathogen. In FY 2001, we made significant progress in establishing diagnostic detection equipment based on antibody detection of pathogens. The program transitioned this time-resolved fluorescence technology to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which has successfully validated assays for four threat agents for their emergency response network. Rapid sequencing techniques have also advanced significantly in FY 2001, with demonstrations of rapid sequencing through nanopores at Harvard University. Additional efforts initiated in FY 2002 expand the investment in rapid sequencing, using natural enzymes responsible for reading DNA to sequence DNA in real-time. Further efforts in FY 2003 will be aimed at new mathematical tools to extract information from data-rich diagnostic collection procedures in order to provide early pre-symptomatic diagnostic detection.

    The Unconventional Pathogen Countermeasures (UPC) program is developing broad-spectrum countermeasures for threat pathogens. This includes anti-viral and antibiotic drug discovery and development, as well as new approaches to vaccinations. Three UPC projects have shown promise in initial evaluations and are transitioning to the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) for further development: a drug designed to attack the DNA of bacteria, viruses and malaria; a family of drugs that target a common and critical enzyme in anthrax and other bacteria; and a protein fragment that blocks the effects of toxins released by bacteria. In addition, the U.S. Army Institute for Surgical Research, Fort Sam Houston, is evaluating skin decontamination by nanoemulsion technology. In FY 2002, we anticipate transitioning other successes to USAMRIID, including novel antibiotic therapeutics, computer-based approaches to shorten the time to develop new antibiotics, and novel vaccines/immune stimulants and platforms. A novel vaccine enhancer developed under the UPC program is likely to transition to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention or USAMRIID later this year. By FY 2003, we expect to have additional programs ready for transition including vaccine candidates, novel enzyme antibacterial therapeutics, and new approaches to using computers to accelerate the process of discovering therapeutics.

    In DARPA’s Genetic Sequencing of Biological Warfare Agents program, the validated threat agent organisms whose sequences had not yet been characterized were sequenced and analyzed via modern, high-throughput sequencing technologies. The organisms we sequenced and analyzed are: Coxiella burnetti (Q fever), Rickettsia typhi (typhus), Burkholderia mallei (glanders), Brucella suis (brucellosis), Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene), and Franciscella tularensis (tularemia). Additionally, several more strains and variants of orthopoxviruses related to smallpox are being sequenced, and an orthopoxvirus database was established in collaboration with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases. These efforts provide immediate benefit to developers of diagnostic and forensic assays based on nucleic acid sequence. A longer-term impact is that the sequence information provides new molecular targets for developing therapies and vaccines.

    DARPA has successfully completed development and transition of the Advanced Consequence Management software program for the management of medical resources and casualties in the event of an attack from weapons of mass destruction. The Enhanced Consequence Management Planning and Support System (ENCOMPASS) has been installed at the Crisis Consequence Management Initiative laboratory at Space and Naval Warfare System Center-San Diego for transitioning to Joint Forces Command, National Guard Net, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The technology has become one of the pillars for the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration for Homeland Defense. The DARPA Syndromic Surveillance System, a component of ENCOMPASS, has been used in multiple military and national special events. In addition, the Air Force’s Lightweight Epidemiology Advanced Detection and Emergency Response System, which uses key segments of ENCOMPASS, has obtained funding to implement these vital tools at military bases to enhance telemedicine consultation capabilities. 

    Building Protection

    In addition to Biological Warfare Defense component technologies, DARPA is developing complete system solutions to counter the biological warfare threat. The goal of the Immune Building program, begun in FY 2001, is to make military buildings far less attractive targets for attack by chemical or biological warfare agents by reducing the effectiveness of such attacks via active and passive response of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems, and other building infrastructure (e.g., neutralization and filtration). This ambitious goal can only be achieved through a combination of technology development and systems-level experimentation. The program is leveraging earlier efforts in these technologies (e.g., decontaminating foams and novel materials that can be used for both chemical and biological filtration) and is extending them for use in this application. The program is also developing new component technologies specifically for this application, such as: using chlorine dioxide for the decontamination of small, inaccessible spaces within buildings; specialized low-pressure-drop filtration for use at return vents; and high-efficiency/long-lifetime sources of ultraviolet radiation for on-the-fly neutralization of agents in airways and ductwork. In FY 2001, we initiated a number of these technology development efforts. In addition, several industry teams evaluated candidate architectures for complete building protection systems. In FY 2002, those technologies and prototypes that successfully passed the evaluation process will be incorporated as components of the complete protection system. We will instrument full-scale test-beds for experimentation with end-to-end systems. Two industry teams are currently refurbishing existing facilities at the old Fort McClellan site (AL) and the Nevada Test Site (NV) for complete system tests scheduled for Government evaluation in FY 2003. The results of these experiments will drive the design of optimal protection systems in FY 2003. In addition, we are developing and validating a modeling capability to enable the application of Immune Building principles to future buildings. To help address the “anthrax letter” problem, DARPA has also initiated efforts to develop portal barrier technologies and to screen and/or neutralize chemical or biological agents in mail and closed containers. 

    Air And Water Purification

    Clean air and water are crucial to the sustained operation of our Military Services in the event of a biological and chemical warfare attack. To-date, our program in Air and Water Purification has demonstrated encouraging results. Warfighters must be able to obtain potable water quickly, and their water purification devices and beverage containers must be integrated in order to work and pack away together. In one project, a pen-sized mixed chemical oxidant unit kills or inactivates microbial pathogens, prevents re-growth of microbial contaminants for days after initial treatment, and provides an order-of-magnitude improvement in disinfection against spores compared with chlorine or iodine. The mixed-oxidant operated water treatment pens are now being selectively field-tested by the U.S. Marines Corps and Special Forces personnel in Afghanistan. The U.S. Marine Corps plans to transition this device into their official enhancement program.

In another project, a New Generation Hydration System will produce microbiologically safe drinking water and beverages from sources of unknown quality and will provide an efficient storage and delivery system for hands-free, on-the-move hydration. One of the program’s key design objectives is to be able to purify all available water sources in the field, including desalinating seawater, into a potable nutrient solution contained in a forward osmosis membrane bag. The program has completed proof-of-principle experiments showing technical feasibility, including preventing chemical and biological challenge agents from penetrating the interior of the bag. During the remainder of FY 2002, the program is optimizing the components of the system, mainly by increasing the water flux through the membrane to produce more potable solution faster. The U.S. Marine Corps also plans to transition this device into their enhancement program.

The Air and Water Purification program is also developing pioneering approaches for advanced gas mask filters. Today’s masks have higher-than-desirable breathing resistance, and their capacity (the period of time they effectively filter) is limited. We have demonstrated the proof-of-principle that microfibrous carriers make better use of carbon to adsorb chemical agents and that they accomplish this with an inherent particulate filtration capability. FY 2001 and FY 2002 data have already shown a reduction in the pressure drop by at least a factor of two over current C2A1 canisters, while maintaining a longer period of time for the filters to operate effectively. Future work is planned to employ this unique filter material as the mouthpiece of vastly improved smoke hoods used for emergency escape.

    PROTECTION FROM INFORMATION ATTACK

The Department of Defense has a critical and growing dependence on the information systems that are key to the future joint vision of warfare. Moreover, our critical infrastructures – and the economic success of our nation – similarly depend on this technology, and the poor state of security in those networks and systems is a well-recognized national vulnerability. Widely used commercial software is riddled with security holes, and attacks are so common that the DoD and other large organizations require full-time staffs to analyze and respond to serious incidents, while still only seeing a small portion of all attacks. Computers and networks in the private sector are poorly defended and can be compromised and turned to attack DoD networks without the knowledge of the system owner. At the same time, potential nation-state adversaries are known to be preparing cyber attack techniques to undermine U.S. computers and infrastructures in case of a conflict. 

To address these challenges, DARPA’s Information Assurance and Survivability suite of programs was created to raise strong barriers to cyber attack and provide commanders with technology to see, counter, tolerate, and survive sophisticated cyber attacks. 

In FY 2001, the Information Assurance and Survivability suite of DARPA programs made significant progress toward these goals. Selected accomplishments from these programs include:

• Developing correlation and analysis algorithms to detect and track complex multi-phase or large-scale cyber attacks (Cyber Command and Control / Strategic Intrusion Assessment programs);

• Developing techniques for assessing cyber attack impact at the system functional level from network-level alerts, such as signature, anomaly, and effects-based attack detections (Cyber Command and Control / Strategic Intrusion Assessment programs);

• Developing techniques to isolate corrupted or malicious network entities (Fault Tolerant Networks program);

• Developing technology to thwart denial-of-service attacks by constraining an attacker’s computing resource consumption capability (Fault Tolerant Networks program); and

• Prototyping protocols for negotiation of policies across coalition members (Dynamic Coalitions program).
  

    The following program descriptions provide additional details:

    The Operational Partners in Experimentation program rapidly puts advanced information assurance technology into the warfighter’s hands for accelerated transition to the operational community and improved feedback to the research community. Operational Partners in Experimentation provides a risk-managed process for high-tempo operators to evaluate revolutionary, but experimental, technologies like embedded firewall or anomaly-based intrusion detection systems. The DARPA embedded firewall demonstrated tremendous success in stopping a military red team during the 2001 Fleet Battle Experiment India, where it was identified by the Navy as the most promising technology. The Navy has already begun the process of programming and budgeting to buy these embedded firewalls in bulk, and the specific technical results from the ramp-up to these exercises invariably provides feedback crucial to the effective maturation of these technologies. As a second example, anomaly-based intrusion detection holds the potential of detecting the more sophisticated threats that slip by current sensors, while reducing by a factor of 100 the volume of noise through which analysts must sift to find such threats. Based on early findings, the Department of Defense’s Computer Emergency Response Team has already incorporated DARPA anomaly detection into an upgrade of the Joint Intrusion Detection System, fielded worldwide. We are studying possibilities for extending these breakthroughs to coalition operations in FY 2003. 

    The Dynamic Coalitions program is developing technologies for establishing distributed coalitions of joint and/or military users working together for a common mission. These technologies include capabilities for establishing security policies for essential operations, securing the underlying group communication infrastructure, and providing the necessary coalition infrastructure services, such as authentication (ensuring the identity of an individual) and authorization (ensuring the individual has the authority to perform certain functions, which must be present for secure collaboration in coalition environments). Managing security policies is critical for the establishment and maintenance of network-centric coalitions. During the creation of a coalition it is essential to ensure that only those participants that are expected to be part of the coalition are allowed to join, and anyone else is restricted from joining through the group communication and access policies. Lastly, coalitions will require additional infrastructure security services to support operations across multiple domains among varied partners. More frequently than ever, we are joining forces with allies in military exercises and engagements. The technologies being developed by the Dynamic Coalitions program will ensure secure interoperability with our coalition partners. It is essential that we know our coalition partners are trusted as coalition operations are carried out. In FY 2001, the program began development of several technologies: policy language compilers, secure group communication toolkits, and public key infrastructure revocation architectures. In FY 2002, we will perform several experiments consisting of coalition policy negotiation, translation, and enforcement among three to five coalition domains. These experiments are being carried out as part of a joint U.S./Sweden coalition experiment to demonstrate that coalitions can be dynamically created, used, and disbanded in rapid timeframes for various military scenarios. In FY 2003, we plan to perform experiments including coalition formation, dynamic membership changes, dynamic policy updates, revocation and rekeying in response to threats, and coalition dissolution.

    The Fault Tolerant Networks program is developing technologies to ensure that today’s DoD networks – and the networks of the future – can ensure continued availability and graceful infrastructure degradation under partially successful attacks, thereby maximizing the residual capacity available to legitimate users. Current attacks are becoming more sophisticated, and the technologies being developed today are focused on defending against future attacks. Technologies being developed include: (i) ensuring the fault-tolerance and secure survivability of critical network services; (ii) technology to thwart denial-of-service attacks by constraining an attacker’s resource consumption, i.e., reducing the amount of network bandwidth or central processing unit cycles available to the attacker; (iii) capabilities to trace and contain attacks as close to the source as possible; (iv) techniques that assist in network recovery from a degraded state to a minimal operational state; and (v) tools that assist in network reconstitution from a minimal operational state to a fully operational state, so that previously successful attacks will have no impact on the new, fully-operational state. In FY 2001, we demonstrated techniques to isolate corrupted and malicious network entities and trace back network attacks, similar to isolated denial-of-service attacks that have been prevalent on the Internet. In FY 2002, we will demonstrate capability to provide detection and defense against distributed denial-of-service attacks. These attacks include tens-of-attacking-hosts against a single victim with traffic loads equivalent to T1 communication channels (1.44 megabytes per second). In addition, technology to establish a secure router infrastructure will begin transition to commercial partners. The transition is occurring through direct communications between the researcher and several router vendors as part of an established routing vendor consortium. In FY 2003, the program will demonstrate algorithms for path classification and selection of protocols for creating resilient network overlays within a modular routing architecture. These network overlays are important to ensure continued operation of the network in the face of an attack, providing alternate communication paths, and ensuring continued network operation. We will also perform an exhibition of secure, graceful degradation of critical network services under large-scale attack, and we will demonstrate tools, techniques, and mechanisms for network recovery and reconstitution in the face of a concentrated network attack. This will be demonstrated on a test network, not an operational network, in order to control the attack traffic and ensure that the attacks are contained. 

    The Cyber Panel program is developing technologies for monitoring the DoD’s critical networked information systems for signs of sophisticated and coordinated cyber attacks and responding to avert them or defend against them. Cyber Panel uses and builds upon the capabilities developed in the Cyber Command and Control/Strategic Intrusion Assessment programs, completed in FY 2001. Technologies being developed include: (i) detection sensor capabilities that look for unusual behavior by users or system application functions, such as web servers, to discover attacks – even when no known vulnerabilities were observed to be exploited; (ii) correlation techniques that compare observations from different types of detection sensors in different network locations to look for evidence of coordinated attacks; (iii) large-scale attack analysis algorithms that help identify the scope, virulence, and spread-rate of widespread attacks, such as worm software that replicates itself to many computers; (iv) techniques to gauge the potential effects of discovered attacks on militarily-critical tasks being performed by the information system; and (v) techniques to identify and execute effective defensive actions, such as isolating threatened systems, reconfiguring access permissions, or redirecting tasks to alternate computing resources. In FY 2001, Cyber Command and Control/Strategic Intrusion Assessment demonstrated correlation techniques that can: (i) use probability-based algorithms to draw accurate conclusions about distributed attacks, even when specifics of the attack method are not known; (ii) detect slow and stealthy system scans attempting to map a defended network, even when they consist of just a few packets separated by hours and coming from multiple colluding attackers; and (iii) reduce the burden on human analysts by rank-ordering attack alerts based on the criticality and vulnerability of threatened systems, and determining when there are benign explanations for apparent correlated attack behavior. A cyber defense planning tool was also developed and is being examined for potential transition to the Navy’s Fleet Information Warfare Center and the Army’s Land Information Warfare Activity. In FY 2002, Cyber Panel will demonstrate capabilities to respond in sub-second times to rapidly parry detected attacks on computer systems in a laboratory environment and test correlation capabilities in a live data environment with the Air Force Research Laboratory for potential transition into Air Force operational use. Cyber Panel will also demonstrate the ability for detection systems to communicate across organizational boundaries to trace back routes taken by attacks and take coordinated defensive responses, and it will show the ability to develop response courses of action for human-directed execution. In FY 2003, Cyber Panel will extend fast automatic response execution beyond individual computer systems to defend local networks, develop techniques to slow the spread of virulent attacks, and work to begin transition of response assessment techniques. The Cyber Panel program, building upon the results of Cyber Command and Control/Strategic Intrusion Assessment, provides a combination of: (i) intelligent monitoring to mitigate known and unknown vulnerabilities of DoD systems; (ii) correlation and fusion to identify the most serious attacks from the thousands of alerts human defenders are faced with and assess how military-relevant computerized tasks are affected; (iii) fast automatic responses to buy time for humans to assess the situation; and (iv) deliberative planning and assessment for deciding upon the best defensive course of action. These capabilities provide the core of an ability to perform command and control for defense of the cyber assets upon which the DoD depends for its information superiority.

    The Organically Assured and Survivable Information Systems (OASIS) program changes the current mind-set of preventing information system intrusions at all costs to a strategy of employing effective safeguards designing the system so that mission critical operations can continue in the event of a system fault. The OASIS program is designing, developing, implementing, demonstrating, and validating architectures, tools and techniques that will allow fielding of organically dependable and robust systems. Critical DoD operational systems will be able to operate through a cyber attack, degrade gracefully if necessary, and allow real-time, controlled trade-offs between system functionality and performance and system security. In FY 2001, OASIS projects demonstrated: (i) effective techniques to protect systems from malicious code attached to emails and transmitted via the Internet; (ii) technology to guarantee the integrity of commercial-off-the-shelf and legacy software; and (iii) a method to prove the legitimacy of code, intrusion-tolerant web servers, and data storage schemes. In FY 2002, OASIS is demonstrating achievements in certificate authority, survivable servers and clients, real-time execution monitors and mobile agent protection, as well as validating redundant architectures using design diversity. In FY 2003, OASIS technologies will be evaluated for their effectiveness in tolerating cyber intrusions and attacks, and their performance will be characterized. In addition to its current transition of specific technologies to the military, the program will culminate in a working prototype of a military mission critical system that will show the feasibility of developing highly dependable systems. The Joint Battlespace Infosphere information systems, responsible for producing Air Tasking Orders, will be fortified with OASIS technologies. The demonstration will consist of continued production, real-time modification, and execution of Air Tasking Orders, even while many of the Joint Battlespace Infosphere information systems are under a sustained cyber attack by a red team. The demonstration is planned for the end of FY 2004.

    MAINTAIN UNHINDERED ACCESS TO SPACE AND PROTECT U.S. SPACE CAPABILITIES

    DARPA is placing an increased emphasis on developing and flying space technologies and spacecraft for new missions. The importance of space to our nation and its security was expressed by the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, whose final report stated that:

The security and economic well being of the U.S. and its allies and friends depend on the nation’s ability to operate successfully in space. To be able to contribute to peace and stability in a distinctly different but still dangerous and complex global environment, the U.S. needs to remain at the forefront in space, technologically and operationally, as we have in the air, on land and at sea. Specifically, the U.S. must have the capability to use space as an integral part of its ability to manage crises, deter conflicts and, if deterrence fails, to prevail in conflict.

    One of the Commission’s five conclusions concerned space science and technology:

[I]nvestment in science and technology—not just facilities, but people—is essential if the U.S. is to remain the world’s leading space-faring nation. The U.S. Government needs to play an active, deliberate role in expanding and deepening the pool of military and civilian talent in science, engineering and systems operations that the nation will need. The government also needs to sustain its investment in enabling and breakthrough technologies in order to maintain its leadership in space.

    The Secretary of Defense has directed that DARPA, along with the Service laboratories, undertake research and demonstration of innovative space technologies and systems for dedicated military missions. The DARPA investments in space are consistent with our charter to solve national-level technology problems, foster high-risk, high-payoff military technologies to enable operational dominance, and to avoid technological surprise. Two of the strengths DARPA brings to space R&D are the flexibilities provided by Congress in our hiring processes and in our contracting methods for rapid prototype development. These enable DARPA to take advantage of rapidly evolving commercial technologies and emerging scientific breakthroughs to create real innovation in space systems.

    The Orbital Express program is designed to create a revolution in space operations by demonstrating the feasibility of refueling, upgrading, and extending the life of on-orbit spacecraft. Automated spacecraft will perform all of this space work, lowering the cost of doing business in space and providing radical new capabilities for military spacecraft, such as high maneuverability, autonomous orbital operations, and satellites that can be reconfigured as missions change or as technology advances. Giving military satellites the capability to maneuver on-orbit would provide them with dramatic advantages: they would be able to evade attacking spacecraft and could escape observation by making their orbits less predictable to adversaries. Last year, the three Phase I contractor teams completed their operational system concept definitions and demonstration system preliminary designs. The teams prioritized the enabling technologies needed to prove the technical feasibility of on-orbit servicing, developed preliminary designs for a cost constrained initial demonstration, and they developed plans for additional development into an operational system once technical feasibility has been proved. DARPA has selected the Boeing Company team to build a two-satellite, on-orbit servicing demonstration. Initial efforts will concentrate on the autonomous guidance, navigation, and control software for rendezvous and docking, the highest technical risk area in the program. Fabrication and ground test of the two space vehicles will continue through mid- to late FY 2005. Launch services are being arranged through the DoD Space Test Program, with launch anticipated in mid-FY 2006, based on the Space Test Program’s current budget. 

    The objective of the Responsive Access, Small Cargo, Affordable Launch (RASCAL) program is to design and develop a low-cost orbital insertion capability for dedicated micro-size satellite payloads. The concept is to develop a responsive, routine, small payload delivery system capable of providing flexible access to space using a combination of reusable and low-cost expendable vehicle elements. Specifically, the system will comprise a reusable “airplane-like” first stage, with expendable second and third stages integrated to a top stage with avionics and payload. RASCAL demonstration objectives are to place 50 kilogram satellites and commodity payloads into low-earth orbit any time, at any inclination, with a launch efficiency of $20,000 per kilogram or less. The technology, combined with the concept of operations envisioned, will revolutionize the space launch industry by paving the way toward a $10,000 per kilogram efficiency in the operational phase. While the demonstration payload cost goal is commensurate with current large payload launch systems, it will be more than a factor of three less than current capabilities for the dedicated micro-payload size after transition to the Services. This capability will enable cost-effective use of on-orbit replacement/re-supply systems, such as the Orbital Express concept, and provide a means for rapid launch of orbital assets for changing national security needs. With recent advances in design tools and simulations, this program will prudently reduce design margins and trade-off system reliability to maximize cost effectiveness. This program will also leverage advancements in autonomous range safety, first-stage guidance, and predictive vehicle health diagnoses, management, and reporting to lower the recurring costs of space launch. In FY 2002, the first year of the program, DARPA is starting system concept definition, demonstration of aircraft propulsion adaptation to first-stage mission requirements, and system requirements and conceptual design reviews. In FY 2003, DARPA will conduct critical design reviews of the first-stage vehicle and select the teams for the design phase of the program.

    The Satellite Protection and Warning / Space Awareness (SPAWN) program will demonstrate the technical feasibility of using microsatellites to provide enhanced, near-field space situational awareness for U.S. space assets in geosynchronous orbit to avoid unanticipated gaps in satellite support to military operations. A key goal of SPAWN is to develop a highly capable, modular microsatellite bus architecture with standard payload interfaces to take advantage of launch capabilities provided by RASCAL. This modular bus will also be used to host a variety of other “plug and fly” sensors and scientific instruments. SPAWN will feature a high degree of autonomous operation, anomaly recognition, and reporting to minimize the impact on ground operations. In FY 2002, we are initiating mission analysis, concept definition, and preliminary design studies for a SPAWN system, and we are identifying the objectives of a proof of feasibility prototype demonstration. Based on the results of this Phase I effort, DARPA will, with input from the customer community, make a decision whether to proceed into a Phase II demonstration. In Phase II, detailed designs of the on-orbit demonstration spacecraft will occur, and the spacecraft will be fabricated, ground-tested, and space-qualified. Finally, in FY 2006 the SPAWN demonstration spacecraft will be launched as part of the Orbital Express mission to perform a series of on-orbit demonstrations.

    The Space Surveillance Telescope program is developing a large-aperture optical telescope with very wide field-of-view using curved focal plane array technology. This will facilitate the detection and tracking of very faint objects in deep space, such as asteroids and debris. Both detection sensitivity and search coverage rate will improve approximately an order-of-magnitude over current capabilities. FY 2002 is the first year of the program, during which an initial design study is being conducted to determine sensor and optics requirements, as well as a system deployment concept of operations. In FY 2003, the first tile of the sensor focal plane will be fabricated, and fabrication of the primary optics will begin.

    The Deep View program is developing a high-power, high-resolution, ground-based radar to image and characterize small objects in both low-earth orbits and deep space. This will provide the capability to perform a variety of space surveillance missions, including characterizing debris and other objects that are more than an order-of-magnitude smaller than current capabilities allow, and monitoring satellite health. FY 2002 is the first year of the program, during which initial design of the high-power transmitter tubes will be completed. In FY 2003, the program will fabricate and test the first transmitter tube and begin detailed development of the full transmitter and receiver subsystem.

    The Innovative Space-based Radar Antenna Technology study program will investigate novel technologies and conceptual designs aimed at producing extremely lightweight (approximately five kilograms per square meter), compact (approximately 400 cubic meters, fully-stowed volume), and affordable space-based radar antennas that meet the stressing requirements of continuous tactical-grade tracking of ground moving targets for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Such a system will provide wide area surveillance with high revisit rates (approximately 10 seconds), wideband operation, high range-resolution GMTI modes (approximately one foot resolution), and low minimum detectable velocity. This combination of requirements will drive investments in very large-scale antennas, as well as in novel materials and packaging appropriate to launching and deploying such a system. In FY 2002, we are evaluating multiple systems designs, and we are carrying out preliminary labs tests on candidate inflatable technologies. In FY 2003, we will develop detailed system designs, and we will conduct targeted ground-based scale model proof-of-concept demonstrations.

    Today’s national imaging systems are highly capable and support a wide variety of user needs. However, the “one size fits all” requirement leads to a few massive, highly complex, and expensive spacecraft, the largest launch vehicles, and a vast worldwide distribution network. The Low Cost Tactical Imager (LCTI) program is designed to address the unique needs of the tactical warfighter by developing a low-cost, high-resolution, day/night imaging spacecraft with the capability to launch on demand – anywhere, anytime, and into any orbit – to support the tactical warfighter. LCTI will demonstrate novel technologies, such as Fresnel lens, membrane mirrors, and lightweight optics, to reduce the spacecraft mass by a factor of two and the telescope mass by a factor of 10 to enable launch on an air-launched booster. LCTI will provide the first-ever ability to task the spacecraft and downlink the imagery in the same pass to support near-real time imaging and targeting of emitters, perform rapid bomb damage assessment, and defeat denial and deception techniques. LCTI will begin in FY 2003 with systems designs and telescope development.

    The Tactical Optical Sensing program will develop and demonstrate technology to give the battlefield commander both moving target indications (MTI) over a wide area (200 kilometers-by-200 kilometers) and high-resolution imaging over a small area (approximately five kilometers-by-five kilometers), using the same optical sensor. This combination of capabilities in a single system enables true tactical use of space-based optical sensors, allowing the U.S. to move quickly from a surveillance mode to a target tracking-and-identification mode. This program will develop foveating imaging techniques, which have a large field-of-view with coarse resolution, combined with a narrow field-of-view with fine resolution (the fovea). The program will also develop techniques for doing MTI with optical sensors. In FY 2003, the first year of the program, we will develop robust foveated imaging technology and optical MTI techniques in laboratory devices.

    The Tactical Pointing Determination of Imaging Spacecraft (TPDIS) program will develop a space surveillance radar to provide the warfighter with near-real-time determination of where an adversary’s overhead imaging spacecraft is pointing. Today, commanders are warned when imaging spacecraft overfly the theater so that they may schedule their activities to avoid detection, or camouflage or conceal targets to deny or deceive the adversary. The area accessible to imagers on an overflight is large, and there is currently no theater-based capability to determine what terrain the spacecraft have attempted to image. TPDIS will develop an order-of-magnitude improvement in resolution and accuracy over the current state-of-the-art to provide position and pointing information of space-based imagers. TPDIS will offer warfighters indication and warning of an adversary’s attempt to image U.S. and allied forces. In FY 2003, we will complete trade studies and requirements definition to evaluate the feasibility of TPDIS to achieve the required tracking performance. In addition, we will begin risk reduction on the radar hardware, and we will develop an initial system design.

    The Coherent Communications, Imaging and Targeting (CCIT) program could lead to more efficient systems for tracking satellites and transmitting communications to them from mobile platforms. Current systems, which use adaptive optics (flexible mirrors whose surfaces can be changed to compensate for atmospheric aberrations or distortions), are too heavy to use in mobile platforms. The CCIT program will demonstrate aberration-free communications, imaging, and tracking using the coherent properties of laser light and aberration correction spatial light modulator devices that employ microelectromechanical technology. In FY 2002, we will demonstrate the spatial light modulator devices with scalable architecture. The program is developing three device types, and we will assemble the most promising into a laboratory CCIT system, followed by a demonstration at greater than one kilometer range in FY 2003. All three Military Services are potential customers, as CCIT provides capabilities for secure communications.

Operational Dominance

    Programs in this area are aimed at developing the advanced systems and technologies needed to achieve Full Spectrum Dominance, leapfrogging current capabilities and threats to give our warfighters a decisive edge. Sub-areas of particular note here are Affordable, Precision, Moving Target Kill, and Combined Manned and Unmanned Systems. 

    AFFORDABLE, PRECISION, MOVING TARGET KILL

    Current approaches to destroying time-critical moving targets include area-of-effect munitions and man-in-the-loop targeting. These approaches traditionally involve large and very expensive weapons, the potential for large collateral damage, and, often, the requirement to put a warfighter in harm’s way. DARPA is responding by developing low-cost, highly capable weapon systems networked to a variety of sensors in order to precisely find and destroy the right land targets in any terrain, in any weather, moving or not, at any time.

    Information Exploitation

    On October 31, 2001, DARPA established the Information Exploitation Office to emphasize development of sensor and information system technology and systems with application to battlespace awareness, targeting, command and control, and the supporting infrastructure required to address land-based threats in a dynamic, closed-loop process. Programs will leverage ongoing DARPA efforts in sensors, sensor exploitation, information management, and command and control. Pooling these programs together in one office will provide additional focus to agency efforts addressing the systemic challenges associated with performing surface target interdiction in environments that require very high combat identification confidence and an associated low likelihood for inadvertent collateral damage. The programs will exploit the synergies between:

• Appropriate sensor, sensor control, and sensor data exploitation capabilities to achieve confirmed target identification to ensure that specified targets (including challenging targets) are correctly engaged without undesirable collateral damage; 

• Dynamic battle management systems, to ensure effective and efficient use of sensors, sensor platforms, weapons, weapons platforms, and resources required for exploitation and decision-making and assessment; and

• Supporting infrastructure to ensure rapid dissemination, timely processing, effective human-computer interaction, and the availability of suitable threat and terrain models.

    Threats of interest include mobile and fixed surface targets in all environments, i.e., open, partially obscured, in “hide” (e.g., under foliage), in evasive maneuver, and in urban settings.

The Tactical Targeting Network Technologies (TTNT) program is developing, evaluating, and demonstrating the airborne wireless networking communications technology necessary for denying sanctuary to time-critical surface targets (for example, mobile surface-to-air missiles and launchers, and armor columns). To rapidly target mobile opponents, the technology will provide high performance, robust, and interoperable data communications for tactical aircraft to work: (i) with each other; (ii) with unmanned air vehicles; (iii) with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms; and (iv) with ground stations. These communications support essential targeting and sensor-to-shooter coordination, such as that which is currently occurring on a very limited scale with Predator operations in Operation Enduring Freedom. TTNT goals include: (i) real-time, battle-driven communication capacity assignment; (ii) minimal delay for high-priority messages; (iii) a data-rate that can support secure video transmission; (iv) low-cost insertion into most platforms; and (v) complete coexistence with existing tactical data links, such as Link 16. Link 16, the current common data link for most air, sea, and critical ground platforms, originated 30 years ago. While robust, Link 16 was not designed to support growing U.S. targeting communication needs. TTNT will develop the responsive communications infrastructure required to conduct collaborative, time-critical targeting and prosecution on a dynamic battlefield. And TTNT will enable emerging targeting systems, such as Affordable Mobile Surface Target Engagement and Advanced Tactical Targeting Technologies, to achieve their full capabilities. TTNT contracts have been awarded to four prime contractors: L-3 Communications Corp. (Salt Lake City, UT); Rockwell Collins Inc (Cedar Rapids, IA); BAE Systems (Wayne, NJ); and VIASAT Inc (Carlsbad, CA). Technology study contracts have been awarded to Ohio University (Athens, OH), Purdue University (West Lafayette, IN), and the Southwest Research Institute (San Antonio, TX). The DoD Joint Spectrum Center is also under contract to the TTNT program. The close working relationship with the Joint Spectrum Center has allowed the program to address the issue of radio spectrum availability from the outset, permitting TTNT to anticipate and to avoid contention with both civilian and military users. Active monitoring of Asian and European leading edge civilian wireless technology development is being conducted via the Asian Technology Information Program (Albuquerque, NM). This activity ensures that rapidly evolving commercial wireless technologies are not overlooked if they can contribute to TTNT. In FY 2002, we will complete the initial system designs and conduct critical component tests, followed by a narrowing down to two or more designs for further development. These tests will be development tests to prove out the system concept and packing/integration techniques for minimizing the cost of widespread deployment. In FY 2003, the program will build brass-board designs and conduct hardware-in-the-loop tests of the candidate systems. If these development tests are successful, the proven concepts will be further tested in operationally realistic situations, with potential military user participation.

The Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement (AMSTE) project is developing technologies to make it feasible and practical for the warfighter to precisely, rapidly, and affordably engage individual moving surface vehicles. AMSTE integrates multiple stand-off radars and long-range weapons into an integrated, networked engagement system, permitting stand-off fighters and surveillance systems to direct low-cost GPS-guided weapons against moving targets. The program will demonstrate that, without expensive modifications to existing and planned systems, networked sensors and weapons can be integrated to provide robust, precise standoff engagement of moving surface targets. In FY 2001, the AMSTE program awarded contracts to Northrop Grumman Corp. Integrated Systems Sector (Melbourne, FL) and Raytheon System Co. (El Segundo, CA), to develop and assemble prototype AMSTE experimental systems (combining representative radar sensors, data links, and weapons) for live-flight experimentation. In the Summer of 2001, the contractor/Government teams conducted a series of developmental flight experiments that culminated in the first-ever successful deliveries of GPS-guided precision weapons against moving vehicles, targeted by standoff networked sensors using AMSTE precision fire control techniques. In FY 2002, the AMSTE program awarded a single contract to Northrop Grumman to develop and incorporate critical enhancements to prototype AMSTE experimental systems to address high-confidence track maintenance in highly cluttered environments for live flight experimentation. At the end of this year, a series of developmental flight experiments will culminate in the delivery of multiple GPS-guided precision weapons against moving vehicles with increasing complexity in both target densities and target dynamics. Further experimentation with the AMSTE system is planned for FY 2003, and the program will develop and incorporate prototype battle management command and control tools to support highly dynamic time-critical target engagements against moving targets with realistically complex target densities and target dynamics. 

The Dynamic Tactical Targeting (DTT) program is developing new sensor control and data fusion technologies that will enable a tactically responsive, warfighter-managed, targeting process. While there are processes in place today that effectively enable the targeting of pre-defined or anticipated targets, recent U.S. military operations have demonstrated that the U.S. needs a more robust ability to conduct true “time-critical targeting.” The new sensor control and data fusion paradigm in DTT will apply the technology necessary to prosecute such targets. With this new paradigm, DTT will extend the ability of the warfighter to obtain information and awareness of the battlespace faster and with the greater fidelity of detail and context necessary to execute in a timely fashion. Time-critical targets have been prosecuted in past operations. However, this was the result of right-place/right-time dynamics, not planning and awareness. DTT will change that. DTT will employ resource management and data fusion technologies to find, identify, and track virtually every vehicle in a 30 kilometer-by-30 kilometer area to focus weapon systems to target and destroy mobile, time-critical targets. The DTT program is directed at challenging surveillance and reconnaissance problems, particularly at reducing the time required to recognize and engage critical, fleeting targets. It will design, build, and demonstrate a process to efficiently manage multi-sensor surveillance of large areas and large numbers of objects, and to extract targets of high interest for hand-off to weapon systems. DTT will hand-off the targets extracted from the many moving objects in the battlespace to precision engagement systems like AMSTE. The goal is to track and identify 10 to 25 critical mobile targets in a 1000 square kilometer area containing approximately 1000 mobile objects. DTT will: (i) leverage existing national/theater intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) sources for timely access to critical data; (ii) dynamically task unattended ground sensors (UGS), unmanned air vehicle (UAV) sensors, and human intelligence (HUMINT) to fill ISR coverage gaps and provide relevant sensor observation in areas of tactical interest; (iii) fuse data from UGS and UAV sensors with ISR data from all sources to enable continuous estimation over time of target location, identity, and activity; and (iv) close the loop between sensor management and fusion to enable timely prosecution of critical fleeting targets. The product of the DTT program will be a transportable test-bed, developed in conjunction with one or more of the Services (Army Space Program Office, Air Force Research Laboratory, and/or Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command) to demonstrate real-time targeting of mobile, time-critical targets in an operational environment. In FY 2002, the program is developing models of UGS, UAV and HUMINT data to enable fusion with national and theater sensor data. We will demonstrate adaptive allocation of ISR sensor resources to enable efficient search profiles, deployment of additional tactical sensors to fill coverage gaps, and track maintenance of objects/targets in the battlespace. In FY 2003, the program will conduct a laboratory demonstration of the DTT system to military users from all Services at the Air Force Research Laboratory. This demonstration will include automatic registration of all sensor data, fusion of national, theater, and tactical sensor data, and dynamic sensor management.

The Real-time Battle Damage Assessment project is developing and demonstrating novel techniques to assess damage to targets caused by small, precision munitions that may cause massive damage to soft vehicular targets, while leaving only scant visible damage on the exterior of the target. The project’s goal is to determine, in real-time, whether a weapon has hit the target and the likelihood that the target is incapacitated. If this information can be determined immediately after the strike, extra sorties for re-strikes can be avoided. The project will use synthetic aperture radars systems, coordinated with weapons delivery, to image the targets before, during, and following the strike to enable damage assessment within seconds. In FY 2001, the project conducted instrumented data collections using airborne sensors and military vehicles (e.g., trucks, air defense vehicles, howitzers, and armed personnel carriers), as well as decoys being struck by a variety of munitions. We used the resulting database to develop prototype detection algorithms and to assess their effectiveness. From this, we have identified promising approaches that involve the analysis of transient radar returns that occur as the weapon hits the target. In FY 2002, this technique is being refined and evaluated using focused data collections emphasizing through-strike sensing. Both soft and hard targets with both kills and near-misses by munitions will be tested to assess the ability of the method to determine kill probability. This data will allow us to provide mature algorithms for damage indication and assessment, which will be tested using the advanced synthetic aperture radar system in the U-2, the intended Joint Strike Fighter radar in a BAC1-11 aircraft, and other radar systems. Our goal is to be able to determine when a target is hit with a 98 percent detection rate, rejecting 99 percent of the near-misses as no-kills.

The Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology (AT3) program is developing and demonstrating technologies to radically improve today’s capability to target surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats. AT3 enables the rapid and accurate targeting of precision-guided weapons to kill modern, more capable enemy SAM systems. These new SAM threats use tactics, such as only staying “on the air” for short periods, that make them challenging targets for current capabilities. The AT3 concept employs non-dedicated platforms (e.g., tactical fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, unmanned air vehicles, unmanned combat air vehicles) to rapidly detect and locate enemy radars by sharing detections and measurements of radar signals using existing tactical data links. The targeting network operates transparently and in an ad hoc manner to provide target locations within 10 seconds of emitter turn-on, from 50 miles away, with an accuracy of 50 meters. The AT3 program has already demonstrated the basic feasibility of the approach in flight tests. In FY 2001, we concentrated on developing and building the full-up hardware and software systems that will be used for strenuous flight tests and investigated promising software techniques to enhance AT3’s capabilities. The AT3 prime contractor, Raytheon Defense Systems, now has these systems ready for aircraft installation. In FY 2002 and FY 2003, the AT3 program will complete the real-time flight tests of the AT3 system against real threats and analyze the test data. In addition to the flight tests, the AT3 program is working diligently on promising transition routes with both the USAF and the Navy.

The goal of the DARPA Counter Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception program is to design, build, test and demonstrate a foliage penetration (FOPEN) synthetic aperture radar (SAR) to provide the warfighter with an all-weather, day or night capability to detect targets hidden under trees or camouflage. The FOPEN SAR will fill the surveillance/reconnaissance gap that currently exists for this large class of targets. Targets of interest include tanks, supply vehicles, mobile surface-to-air missiles systems, guerrilla bases, and drug laboratories. In data collected during FY 2001 at Camp Navajo (AZ), the DARPA FOPEN SAR demonstrated: (i) excellent image quality at 15 kilometer standoff ranges, and (ii) detection of military vehicles concealed under foliage. The detection performance for both single-pass detection and change-detection modes was evaluated during these tests. In FY 2002, the DARPA FOPEN SAR system is being calibrated and characterized in all modes, and will be flown in an extensive series of test flights to measure the system’s capability to detect tanks and other military vehicles under various foliage conditions and imaging geometries. DARPA will also demonstrate the capability of the system to detect other targets, including drug laboratories and surface-to-air missile launchers hidden in foliage, and will participate in a number of military exercises, such as the Joint Combat Identification Test. FY 2002 is the last year DARPA will fund this program. In FY 2003 the FOPEN system will be transferred to the Army. The Army and Air Force will employ it in user demonstrations to support transition of this capability to the Services and to continue terrain characterization flights in support of the Army Future Combat Systems program.

    COMBINED MANNED AND UNMANNED SYSTEMS

    The Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) program is a joint DARPA/Air Force System Demonstration Program to demonstrate the technical feasibility, military utility, and operational value for a UCAV system that can effectively and affordably prosecute suppression of enemy air defenses / strike missions within the emerging global command and control architecture. The DARPA-managed demonstration program will facilitate a seamless transition into an Air Force-managed, effects-based, spiral development program to develop the initial operational capabilities to meet the Congressional goal that one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft should be unmanned by 2010. In FY 2001, the two X-45A demonstrator aircraft and the mission control system were transported to NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, where integration tests were conducted. In FY 2002, the program will complete the first set of X-45A flight tests and the initial design reviews for the low-observable X-45B. In FY 2003, the program will complete multi-vehicle X-45A coordinated flight tests, conduct the X-45B final design review, and begin fabrication of long-lead items. At the end of FY 2003, the UCAV program management will transfer to the Air Force.

    The potential of the unmanned approach to hazardous air missions has also resulted in a joint DARPA/Navy Naval Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV-N) program. The Navy has a need for sea-based, highly survivable, effective, and affordable air power to conduct deep strike, suppression of enemy air defenses, and surveillance missions as part of an integrated air campaign. A Naval Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle can prosecute the enemy integrated air defense system and high-value targets with relative impunity without placing a pilot in harm’s way. In addition, a UCAV-N capability that can maintain continuous vigilance will enable advanced surveillance, suppression of enemy air defenses, and immediate lethal strike for attacking time-critical targets. DARPA and the Department of the Navy have agreed to a joint program to validate the critical technologies, processes, and system attributes and to demonstrate the technical feasibility of a UCAV-N system. The UCAV-N Advanced Technology Demonstration program is structured in two phases: Phase I consists of analysis and preliminary design, and Phase II involves development and demonstration. In July 2000, DARPA awarded two Section 845 agreements to Boeing and Northrop Grumman for analysis and preliminary design of a UCAV-N air system, and those studies were completed in March 2001. In April 2001, the Phase I contracts were modified to permit more complete system preliminary design and to begin risk reduction of critical technologies, processes and system attributes. A successful conclusion to Phase I would lead to a seamless transition into Phase II, the detailed design and fabrication of UCAV-N, in March 2002. Phase II will continue through December 2004.

    The goal of the Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft (UCAR) program is to design, develop, integrate, and demonstrate the enabling technologies and system capabilities required to effectively and affordably perform armed reconnaissance and attack within the Army’s Objective Force system-of-systems environment. The UCAR program will build upon the accomplishments of the unmanned combat air vehicle program to develop the next generation of autonomous and collaborative mission execution capabilities. UCARs will operate autonomously and will execute missions in collaboration with other UCARs, other unmanned systems, and with manned assets. UCAR will build upon the accomplishments of the Army’s Comanche program to develop technologies that enhance the capability of aircraft to survive in a diverse threat environment. UCAR will use off-board sensors for target acquisition, while its on-board sensors specialize in long-range target identification. With both lethal and non-lethal weapons capabilities, UCAR will enable the Army to extend its lethal range by using the UCAR system to locate, identify, and prosecute targets farther in front of U.S. and coalition lines, thereby protecting manned and unmanned ground and air systems. Phase I of the program will begin in the third quarter of FY 2002. The objectives of Phase I are to fully explore the design trade space for the system, develop a conceptual design for the system, substantiate the effectiveness and affordability goals for the system, and develop an initial risk reduction and demonstration roadmap for the program. Phase I is a 12-month effort involving up to four contractor teams.

    DARPA has been a leading force in the development of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) for military applications. The success of these aircraft was recently shown in Afghanistan, where Predator and Global Hawk UAVs provided vital information to warfighters. It is now time to push UAV technology to a new level: it may be possible to develop a UAV that can stay aloft five times longer than Global Hawk, today’s longest-flying UAV. This will be accomplished using the very high energy-to-weight ratio of liquid hydrogen. A liquid-hydrogen-fueled airframe will be at the center of the DARPA Ultra Long Endurance Aircraft Program (UltraLEAP). Combining advanced airframe manufacturing techniques, fuel cell technology, and electric motor driven propellers, UltraLEAP will provide a staring battlefield sensor and communications relay platform for the warfighter at costs per hour of operation that are far lower than today’s UAV platforms. In FY 2002, the program will evaluate supporting technologies and a proof-of-concept design. In FY 2003, we will conduct preliminary design of a demonstrator vehicle and conduct risk reduction on component technologies, including the fuel cell, liquid hydrogen fuel tankage, and an oxygen scavenging compressor.

    The Mixed Initiative Control of Automa-teams (MICA) project is developing technologies that will enable one or a few warfighters to manage many teams of UAVs in an adversarial operational environment. The MICA program will provide a commander in the field with the operational and mission planning tools to select optimal combinations of unmanned platforms, weapons, and sensors to form heterogeneous UAV teams with different platform capabilities and diverse payloads enabling coupled reconnaissance, strike, battle damage assessment, and force protection activities. The program is developing automated methods for real-time dynamic mission planning, mission execution, and event-driven replanning for each UAV team. We will develop collaborative teaming strategies and tactics, and cooperative team member routing to meet mission objectives. At any point in an operation, a commander or operator will be able to intervene in team operations, approve automated asset allocations and cooperative courses of action, or communicate preferences regarding team activities. Stability, performance, and robustness of team operations with an operator-in-the-loop will be emphasized during the mixed initiative dialogue between the human and unmanned air vehicles. In FY 2002, the program is building an initial Open Experimental Platform to evaluate preliminary algorithms for composing heterogeneous teams, and for collaborative planning and cooperative execution of team maneuvers in simulation. This prototype Open Experimental Platform will be expanded to evaluate cooperative management of 2 to 5 teams of 5 to 10 UAVs with an operator-in-the-loop in FY 2003. Military operators will participate in the evaluation of MICA technologies using the Open Experimental Platform in a variety of operational scenarios, including suppression of enemy air defenses and time-critical targeting situations. 

    The Software-Enabled Control program will exploit increased processor and memory capacity to achieve higher performance and more reliable software control systems for mission system platforms. Military applications include integrated avionics design and vehicle control for high performance unmanned air vehicles and unmanned combat air vehicles, as well as upgrades for existing airframes, such as the F-15E, F/A-18, and AV-8B. This research will yield control technology that is robust enough to withstand extreme environments and to enable highly autonomous, cooperating mission systems. In FY 2001, a prototype implementation of the hybrid multi-mode control software was completed for single-vehicle uses, including predictive modeling of environmental effects (e.g., wind gusts and turbulence) and safely controlling mode transitions under such effects. This technology will provide enhanced maneuverability/evasive capability for unmanned air vehicle and unmanned combat air vehicle systems, and enhanced robustness under extreme conditions for piloted systems. Multi-modal control technology will provide better controlled transitions between complex operational flight modes (inherent in vertical takeoff and landing unmanned air vehicles and high performance/transonic manned aircraft), thereby reducing safety risks to the warfighter and vehicle. In FY 2002, the program is developing adaptive hybrid control services to ensure stable operation and extend the control design to support highly coordinated control of multiple platforms. Coordinated multi-modal control technology will simplify the task of controlling groups of unmanned vehicles, increasing the capacity of a single warfighter to safely control large numbers of air and ground vehicles. In FY 2003, Software-Enabled Control will enter an experimental phase, wherein advanced adaptive control techniques will be tested with hardware-in-the-loop simulations and test flights with scaled-down rotary and fixed-wing aircraft. Planning will also begin for program final demonstrations using an F-15E and a T-33 unmanned combat air vehicle surrogate aircraft.

    Autonomous Software for Learning Perception is developing autonomous software for learning, perception, and control. This enables mobile robots to autonomously perform a variety of military tasks in diverse, complex, and dynamic environments. It also supports effective interaction with humans. The ultimate goal for the program is to allow the warfighter to task a robot in the same terms a human is tasked. In FY 2001, the program demonstrated on-line learning techniques that automatically generated desirable, adaptive behaviors and response to voice command instructions. This resulted in successful autonomous task performance. In FY 2002, Autonomous Software for Learning Perception will demonstrate integrated perception, including fusion of data from multiple sensors and multiple ways of processing the same data. It will also demonstrate structured operator intervention for semi-autonomous operation. In FY 2003, the program will demonstrate a trainable, perception-based, autonomous, indoor navigation capability, and multi-sensor outdoor navigation. This will transition to the Future Combat Systems’ Perception for Off-Road Robotics and the Army Research Laboratory’s Robotic Collaborative Tech Alliance programs.

    The Common Software for Autonomous Robotics component supported by the Software for Distributed Robotics (SDR) program is developing software technologies for large groups of extremely small and highly resource-constrained micro-robots. The coordinated action of many robots achieves a collective goal, while allowing the operator to task and query the ensemble of robots as a group, rather than as individuals. The payoff will be distributed “swarm” systems of robots that robustly perform important military tasks, such as area surveillance and mine clearing. SDR has already transitioned task allocation, reusable components and energy-conserving protocols to the Army Research Laboratory’s Robotic Collaborative Tech Alliance, the Future Combat Systems - Communications program, and Urbot, being developed by the Unmanned Ground Vehicle/Systems Joint Program Office and the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. In FY 2001, the program evaluated networking protocols for distributed robot control that are more energy efficient than conventional implementations. It also demonstrated software for coordinating the operation of more than 10 robotic devices in a collective task. In FY 2002, SDR will integrate the energy-conserving network protocols, natural, implicit communications modes, and user interfaces on more than 50 robots. In FY 2003, SDR will demonstrate accelerated mobility and reconnaissance and shared representations to support collaborative communication between humans and robotic systems.

    Future Combat Systems
    The jointly funded, collaborative DARPA/Army Future Combat Systems (FCS) program will define the concept design for a new generation of deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, sustainable, and dominant combat systems. The program will develop and integrate innovative technologies to get more firepower to the battlefield quickly, establish dominance once there, and reduce the risks to U.S. soldiers. A collaborative system of networked sensors along with manned and unmanned platforms are key FCS enablers. DARPA and the Army are developing the technologies to achieve this new way of fighting and managing the development risks carefully in order to field a highly successful combat system.

    FCS is the networked system of systems that will serve as the core building block within all Objective Force maneuver units to develop overmatching combat power, sustainability, agility, and versatility necessary for full spectrum military operations. During FY 2001, four industrial teams, in cooperation with DARPA and Army leadership, engaged in developing FCS concepts, including the identification of technology alternatives and organizational designs. The program was accelerated in FY 2001 to meet the Army’s goal of fielding an Objective Force capability this decade. This led to the DARPA/Army decision to competitively select an industry Lead Systems Integrator in the second quarter of FY 2002 to develop the program in preparation for a Defense Acquisition Board Milestone B decision in the third quarter of FY 2003.

    The following nine programs are developing technology specifically for insertion into FCS, and they represent a major portion of the DARPA contribution to the DARPA/Army partnership:

    Assured communications is critical in tactical environments where the threat of electronic attack is high. When forces are distributed and composed, in part, of robotic vehicular platforms, the consequences of an electronic attack can be catastrophic to successful operations. The Future Combat Systems - Communications (FCS-C) program is developing new, mobile, wireless networking technology capable of simultaneously providing high data-rates (greater than 1 megabits per second), low probability of detection, and robustness to enemy jamming. The FCS-C program proposes to meet these opposing constraints through a multi-tiered mobile ad hoc network utilizing both directional antennas at low-band (e.g., Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) bands) and highly directional antennas at high-band (millimeter-wave frequencies). In FY 2001, we pursued high-risk, high-payoff technology projects in the areas of: (i) high-band technology (e.g., transmitters, receivers, antennas); (ii) low-band (e.g., future JTRS) technology for dynamically exploiting complex radio frequency environments, including multi-path mitigation with diversity techniques, multi-user detection, and space-time processing; (iii) radio frequency information assurance techniques at the network layer and below; and (iv) mobile ad hoc network technology for smoothly blending the high-band and low-band technologies into a single network, including routing, quality-of-service for real-time traffic, topology optimization, acquisition and tracking, and mobility management – all using directional antennas. In FY 2002, two system integration teams were selected to integrate the technologies and perform a series of three demonstrations that show the increasing maturity of the system and its components, from a low-band-only directional capability to an integrated low- and high-band directional capability. In FY 2003, the system integrator team(s) will demonstrate a prototype FCS communications infrastructure in the field. The communications system must be able to maintain assur